Financial crime of the week #2: From Russia with love: the nepobaby who fled Italy using bolt cutters
Boris Bourne makes his film debut as the governor’s son who cut off his ankle monitor with bolt cutters and escaped, much to the lament of Task Force KleptoCapture (yes, this is a real thing)
When I think about effective uses of bolt cutters, I typically imagine scenarios involving padlocks, chain link fences, and bicycle thieves in Amsterdam (where I just spent four years, by the way, and bicycle theft is as much of a baptism ritual as is getting your bike tires stuck between tram lines. The one time someone stole my bike, I had bike insurance and a GPS, so long story short, my baby was located with a warrant, found at 49 Preitoriastraat, and rescued by yours truly - I also left a very nasty note in Dutch and English).
Back to the bolt cutters - so I imagine, you know, your run of the mill bike thief loser. What I do not typically imagine is a Russian governor’s son using bolt cutters to remove his court ordered ankle monitor before embarking on a multi-country exfiltration operation that would make Jason Bourne blush.
Reader, let me introduce you to Artem Uss, the subject of this edition of financial crime of the week, which focuses on this most dramatic fugitive I am henceforth naming Boris Bourne.
Artem is the son of Alexander Uss, who was serving as governor of Russia’s Krasnoyarsk region at the time of his son’s arrest. The younger Uss was arrested in Italy in October 2022 on U.S. charges related to sanctions evasion, money laundering, bank fraud, and a scheme to smuggle sensitive U.S. military technology to sanctioned Russian entities. The technology allegedly included advanced semiconductors and components used in fighter aircraft and missile systems. Some of this technology was later found in Russian military equipment captured on the battlefield in Ukraine.
In the six months between his arrest and pending extradition to the U.S., Uss was held in Italy and placed under house arrest near Milan. The day after an Italian court approved his extradition, on March 22nd, 2023, Uss used bolt cutters to remove his electronic ankle monitor and fled.There is a lot one can say about this but at least he was prompt about it right after getting the news, I guess? Uss just straight up cut that thing off like he was opening a particularly stubborn Amazon package later resurfacing in Russia.
Nowadays, the U.S. government is offering a reward of up to seven million dollars for information leading to Uss’s arrest or conviction. Seven million dollars. That is a lot of moolah, folks. That is not a typo. That’s “we really want this guy” money. That’s “someone in D.C. is very annoyed” money. From memory, I think that’s something like 70 times more than what the Dutch police offered for their biggest fugitive at the time (crime boss Ridouan Taghi, who famously lamented how little the frugal Dutch offered).
So what was Uss’s deal, how did he end up being a modern day everyman’s Boris Bourne?
Uss operated oil, coal, and timber businesses in Russia through various corporate entities tied to his family, including a coal company and a major Siberian timber exporter linked to the Krasnoyarsk region. He also held a senior position at a Rosneft subsidiary. His father’s position gave him connections and protection, which is really just nepotism with extra steps and significantly higher stakes.
Apparently, the world of Russian integrated energy is not enough, as Uss also allegedly ran a separate operation procuring controlled technology from the United States and Europe for Russian buyers who could not legally obtain it because of sanctions and export controls. This is where things get interesting, as for these illicit purposes, Uss used a German trading company called Nord Deutsche Industrieanlagenbau GmbH, which we’ll call NDA GmbH because I refuse to type that full name again, as a front together with his partner Yury Orekhov. This operation became a sustained and organized multi-year thing until Uss got bused.
NDA GmBH became the front for the operation which worked through shell companies and intermediaries in the way that all good sanctions evasion schemes work, which is to say with maximum complexity and minimum transparency. Russian end users would identify technology they needed. Uss and his network would find suppliers in the U.S. or Europe willing to sell. They falsified paperwork claiming the parts were going to places like Malaysia instead of Russia. The technology would be shipped to intermediate countries, then rerouted to Russia. Payment flowed through multiple accounts, shell companies, and even cryptocurrency to obscure both source and destination.
On the day of the escape, according to U.S. court filings, a Bosnian national linked to a Serbian organized crime group went to Uss’s house with other conspirators and handed him bolt cutters. Uss used them to cut off the ankle monitor and tossed the device out the window (like a boss!) before being driven out of Italy. He was then smuggled through Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and into Serbia, eventually flying to Russia from there. One wonders if he had a nice time going through the Alps. I’m kind of envious of the views I’d imagine such a trip to have, if I’m going to be completely honest.
How Uss actually moved at each stage of the exfiltration isn’t fully known in public documents, but investigations and media reporting point to a pre planned route, multiple vehicles, and help from a Balkan criminal network. There’s also speculation about coordination with Russian intelligence or other Russian actors, which seems possible given the sophistication of the operation, but I’m noting that as speculation rather than confirmed fact. The one thing that isn’t speculation is that Uss had sophisticated assistance. You don’t just bolt cutter your way across four countries without a very good plan and very connected friends. I suppose it’s not a bad barometer to have around in terms of life goals, the ability to bolt across places with ease…
Nonetheless, by fleeing in such a dramatic fashion involving multiple countries, organized crime networks, and bolt cutters, Uss sent a very clear message about how he viewed his odds of winning in a U.S. courtroom, which is to say, duh, not good, chances are not good at all for Boris Bourne indeed.
The U.S. investigation was conducted by the FBI and the Commerce Department’s Office of Export Enforcement, with support from the Justice Department’s Task Force KleptoCapture and other agencies that focus on export control enforcement. Task Force KleptoCapture is a real name for a real task force and I need everyone to appreciate that for a moment.
They traced technology from U.S. suppliers through intermediaries to Russian end users, including sanctioned defense firms. Financial records showed Uss and his network were involved in the transactions and payments. I bet Palantir was somehow involved in these investigations. I just know it.
And if I’m wrong, well, somehow something figured out all these parts and pieces as communications and court filings describe how the conspirators misrepresented end users, used shell companies, and discussed evading sanctions.
In October 2022, the U.S. unsealed a 12 count indictment in the Eastern District of New York charging Uss and several co-conspirators in a global sanctions evasion, export control, bank fraud, and money laundering scheme. The charges included conspiracy to defraud the United States, conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, which sounds like something from a sci-fi novel but is actually very real export control law), bank fraud conspiracy, and money laundering conspiracy. Other defendants also face additional counts involving export control violations and smuggling goods from the United States. IEEPA violations can carry up to 20 years in prison per count, and money laundering up to 20 years per count, which means the math on potential sentences gets very large very quickly.
My take
Russia’s defense industry depends heavily on Western technology for certain components, particularly semiconductors and precision electronics. Sanctions are supposed to cut off that supply. Yet procurement networks like the one Uss allegedly ran can circumvent sanctions by routing purchases through third countries, shell companies, and false end user statements. This is a lot of fancy footwork but that comes with the territory of sanctions evasion as tradecraft nowadays. These come with costs not just on paper but in terms of the lives they can take or mutilate as the technology is used for weapons.
What I mean by this is that Uss’s work had real impact as U.S. prosecutors say Uss’s network helped procure Western technology that ended up in Russian weapons systems used against Ukraine. Investigators have found U.S. origin semiconductors in captured Russian equipment, and part of the technology Uss shipped around included semiconductors and microprocessors with both commercial and military applications. Semiconductors are essential for modern military equipment, including targeting systems, communications, drones, and missiles. They are subject to tight export controls when destined for Russia for extremely obvious reasons.
Also notable is how the charges and supporting court documents also describe efforts to source aircraft related parts used in Russian Sukhoi fighters and even the U.S. F 22. That is the kind of detail that makes you wonder about the sheer audacity of trying to procure parts for an American fighter jet to ship to Russia. Who? What? When? Where? Why? Who? Who the hell was doing this, and why? Is there perhaps an oligarch somewhere who is a huge fan of Top Gun and is building an American fighter jet replica?
After Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, sanctions enforcement became more aggressive in the way that active warfare tends to focus the mind on who’s getting what technology and why. When investigators and open source analysts started finding Western technology in destroyed Russian military equipment on Ukrainian battlefields, it’s because of people like Uss and what he helped procure.
Reader note: This is not legal advice. Do not cut off ankle monitors. Do not evade sanctions. Do not smuggle semiconductors to sanctioned entities. For inquiries: ani@anibruna.com.